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It was 42 years before the end of World War II that Joseph Conrad wrote his infamous 
novel “Heart of Darkness,” yet today its relevance to the Congo remains starkly the same, as the 
aegis of colonialism has left a devastating footprint. The novel explores the hypocrisy of 
Belgium’s imperialism as the act of civilizing the African became quite uncivil. The imperial 
incivility, political factionalization, and decades of authoritarian rule and war have led the United 
Nations (UN) to enter the Congo, quite like Marlow’s travel up the Congo River. Yet, amidst the 
chaos of Belgium’s enterprise and the aftermath of World War II, the Congo offers a troubling 
and difficult case for policymakers and for international relations theory. This paper aims at 
pondering this case to hopefully shed light into the heart of darkness and give an explanation for 
‘the horror’ that Kurtz only realized at his final moment.  
Following World War II, it was abundantly clear through international consensus that the 
urgency for preventive action against another world war required the reorganization of the 
League of Nations system. The former colonial and imperial powers of Europe were decimated 
and the United States and Russia stood as victors against an impetuous regime. The global order 
was changing rapidly with the creation of the atomic bomb and the rise of the United States and 
Russia as superpowers. With a potent collective memory, the post-World War II era ushered in 
the establishment of international law and human rights doctrines under the auspices of regional 
and universal organizations, in large part as a result of the UN Charter. On April 25, 1945, the 
Charter of the United Nations (UN) was finalized under the Westphalian principles of 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and peace and security amongst nations.1 The Charter outlined 
principles for peace and prosperity and collective security. Most importantly, the UN Charter 
                                                
1 Karen A. Mingst and Margaret P. Karns, The United Nations in the 21st Century (Westview Press: Boulder, 
Colorado, 2007) 18. 
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motivated several universal documents, which subsequently outlined the fundamental importance 
of individual sovereignty amidst a system dominated by interstate relations. A new global order 
emerged aimed for deterring future wars and creating a council of peaceful discourse amongst 
states. It is important to note that this emergence shifted the international system from a 
Westphalian state-centrism to a UN-based idealism that granted the individual sovereignty and 
autonomy within their respective state, as well as in a newly formed “international community.” 
Although some basic tenets of the Treaty of Westphalia continued, i.e. state sovereignty and the 
right to wage war, this UN idealism assumed the common interests of the member states and 
embarked on massive efforts of international cooperation, conflict resolution and peacekeeping. 
Ultimately, the UN system has moved the international system closer to a cosmopolitan ideal of 
universal norms and laws. 
Peacekeeping, a direct example of UN ambition and its idealism, is not once mentioned 
in the UN Charter; however, the newly formed UN system began a campaign of peacekeeping 
throughout the 1950’s to the present day. In the post-Cold War era, it is hard to imagine that such 
peace and prosperity could have continued in this international “community” given the reuse of 
genocide as a form of war in the 1990’s. The international response to the genocide in Rwanda 
demonstrated several weaknesses in the UN system, such as its inability to work efficiently with 
member states in stopping the systematic slaughter of the Tutsi minority. Instead, the UN 
allowed the genocide to continue as did the United State, the sole superpower. In the DRC, the 
most astounding element is the silence in the international media and the ignorance of the global 
North to the political breakdown of 10 central African states that resulted in a continental war in 
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1998. At the middle of this conflict lies the ‘heart of darkness’2 so pervasive that the very 
foundations of human civility and decency are challenged.   
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has suffered from nearly 70 years of colonial 
rule and exploitation and several decades of authoritarian dictatorship. Since 1998, an estimated 
5.4 to 7.8 million Congolese people have lost their lives due to the conflict, the most of any 
conflict since World War II. Eventually, the UN Security Council voted to initiate a UN mission 
to the Congo after passing UN Resolution 1304(2000).3 The emergence of the United Nations 
Organization Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) has attempted to 
institutionalize normative democratic principles and subsequent international law within the 
government and society. MONUC is currently the largest UN mission in the world consisting of 
nearly 20 thousand military personnel. Dissecting the structural bureaucratic workings of 
MONUC and other international efforts will provide an important basis for understanding the 
current situation on a domestic level.  
At the center of most African politics is the arbitrary nature of the state as a result of 
European colonialism. This arbitrariness is a cause for much of the violence throughout the 
continent as most conflicts surrounding the DRC have rebuked state boundaries and repeatedly 
violated the concept of national sovereignty as granted by international law. This paper aims at 
describing the flaws in the theory of liberal institutionalism in reference to central Africa. The 
nation has failed, the state has failed, and therefore the ability of international institutions to 
build a strong liberal form of government in the DRC is a challenging feat. Additionally, there 
exists a multipolar domestic political system in the DRC, owing to the hundreds of tribal and 
                                                
 
2 Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness: An Authoritative Text Backgrounds and Sources Criticism, Third 
Edition  
3 Mango, Anthony, and Edmund Jan Osmanczyk. Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International 
Agreements. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge, 2004. Print. 
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ethnic affiliations. To assume a national identity and embody a ‘Congolese’ affinity is a first 
major step to unifying the state. Without this element, the DRC can neither exist as a nation nor 
act as a state in the international community. This assumption draws on a very Western plane of 
thought and does not take into account the intransigent nature of African polities, i.e. the 
complex hierarchical systems of tribal unity that already exists. However, given the norms that 
persist within the international community ideal, Congolese affinity is an important element in 
taking control of the government and allocating the resources towards pragmatic means of 
distribution. Amidst the deep-rooted historical connections and ethnocentrisms in the DRC, this 
element separates the Congolese from the international community ideal.  
It is most important for this paper to distinguish between the cosmopolitanism of the 
United Nations and the international community, as the former stems from the latter. The United 
Nations is an international organization of nation-states aimed at engaging in meaningful 
discourse to achieve international peace and security, but also it is a means for states to define 
and pursue their national interests and engage in conflict resolution. The UN is a physical body 
where international law and human rights manifest. The term ‘international community’ is a 
concept stemming from and supported by the UN system and its concept assumes the common 
interests of member states, i.e. states share common goals of international cooperation and peace 
often through collective measures. Therefore, the UN may represent a more cosmopolitan 
approach to international cooperation and peace. However, the term is more difficult to define as 
international relations scholars debate its very existence. Therefore, what is the international 
community in reference to the DRC? To better understand the nature of the international system, 
this paper will focus on two divergent schools of thought in international relations theory; 
cosmopolitanism (universal moral worth as world citizenship) and realism, (state-centrism, state 
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sovereignty and the national interest). After examining these theories in tandem with 
international efforts in the DRC, this paper hopes to find a more consistent construction of the 
international system, and one that can better explain the DRC case.  
Essentially, my thesis aims at examining the DRC in terms of the humanitarian plight, the 
current UN mission, MONUC, and the willingness of states in the international system to 
contribute to the most destructive war since WWII. Based on the evidence of the DRC, what 
view is most consistent, if any? The political breakdown of central Africa and the continued 
humanitarian plight and political strife in the DRC offers a troubling but necessary case in 
international relations as it challenges the efforts of the UN system and the concept of an 
international community following the end of World War II. Is this community only limited to 
the developed states of the global North? What are the implications of events in the DRC for 
how we think about the UN and the notion of an “international community?” This paper aims to 
examine not only the domestic affairs of the DRC through the actions of MONUC, but also to 
investigate and understand what truly lies at the heart of darkness, and what can the UN and the 
supposed international community do about it.  
This analysis is formatted into three sections to better portray important factors in 
analyzing the international community. Section I focuses on the history of the DRC beginning 
with Belgium’s imperialism in 1874 and ending with the fall of Mobutu’s regime in 1997. 
Within this large gap of history, important context is provided with frequent reference to US and 
Russian relations during the Cold War and to other international efforts at the fall of Mobutu’s 
regime and the beginning of the largest war since WWII. The objective of this section is to 
provide a historically motivated base for analyzing the domestic and international forces in the 
DRC. Part II utilizes the domestic and international history to analyze cosmopolitan and realist 
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substantiation. This section will also examine various state relations with the DRC during the 
height of violence, the UN mission (MONUC), and the Security Council’s role in maintaining 
peace. At a larger level, this section as a whole will tie together these factors to offer a 
conclusive view of the international community, which will be provided in section three. In 
conclusion of the first two sections outlined throughout this paper, cosmopolitan ethics cannot be 
supported as a tangible portrayal of the international system given the DRC case. Part II and III 
explain in far more detail this dilemma. Realism continues to shape international efforts in the 
DRC case; however, progress has been made amidst the tumultuous period of the 1990s and the 
DRC case in general.  
 

















Historical and Political Dimensions  
1874 -1999 
 
“They grabbed what they could for the sake of what was to be got. It was just robbery with 
violence, aggravated murder on a great scale, and men going at it blind—as is very proper for 
those who tackle the darkness.”4 
   
     --Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness 
 
 
The Beginning of an Enterprise: King Leopold’s Congo 
 
 The pillaging of African property has been a recurring theme throughout its history 
beginning notoriously with European inquisition and conquest. The invasion that began in the 
early seventeenth century evolved amidst a globalizing international community where a 
European dominated capitalist market and the booming industrial revolution worldwide 
generated a territorial and resource free-for-all. The colonial enterprise that emerged marked an 
era of European dominance that would claim countless lives and destroy many of the indigenous 
cultures and societies of Africa. These economic ventures exploited the vast mineral wealth of 
the Congo and most of the West and Central African kingdoms alongside a massive slave trade. 
Yet amidst the foundering European exceptionalism arose an influential state in European 
affairs, a whited Sepulcher5 of wealth embezzled at the hands of its leader, King Leopold II of 
Belgium.  
                                                
 
4 Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness: An Authoritative Text 3rd Ed (New York, NY, Norton, 1988) 10.  
5 See Joseph Conrad 13, “In a very few hours I arrived in a city that always makes me think of a whited 
sepulchre.” Conrad uses ‘whited sepulchre’ possibly as a metaphorical reference to Brussels,
 Belgium, where much of his imperial campaign over Congo through the AIC was headquartered. A
 Sepulchre refers to a painted tomb containing a corpse. See Holy Bible, Mathew 23: 27-8: “Woe unto
 you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye are like unto whited sepulchres, which indeed appear beautiful
 outward, but are within full of dead men’s bones, and of all uncleanness. Even so ye also outwardly appear
 righteous unto men, but within ye are full of hypocrisy and iniquity.”   
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 Congo’s riches were not discovered by King Leopold II, but rather by a journalist for the 
New York Herald and explorer of great tenure, Henry Morton Stanley. In 1874, Stanley spent 
234 days traveling the Congo River for a missing journalist and found much more than he had 
expected.6 Immediately following this discovery, western societies conjured descriptive plans for 
the ownership, colonization, and eventual exploitation of Africa, but not without reserve. King 
Leopold II, who commissioned Stanley to gain consent from African tribes for colonization, 
formed the first international organization in the Congo, the Association International du Congo 
(AIC), responsible for initiating colonization and building trading posts for Leopold’s 
enterprise.7 The formation of the organization exemplified the changing international and 
regional system in Europe. Two centuries prior, the signing of the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia 
confirmed the need for a balance of power for the growing self-determination of European nation 
states and their economic and political sovereignty. The increasing interdependence amongst 
these states ushered in an era of multilateralism, which came to a standstill at the onset of World 
War I and World War II. Nonetheless, increasing multilateral practices explain the formation of 
the AIC and its eventual legitimacy in central Africa.  
Africa was for the taking and therefore, disputes between major European powers 
required an accordance between claims to territory. In order to appease the contending powers of 
Europe over the formation of the AIC, in November 1884 to February 1885 the Concert of 
Europe, a regional organization designed to initiate multilateral talks amongst its great powers,8 
convened in Berlin to resolve such disputes and eventually recognized Leopold’s claim to the 
Congo under the AIC by passing the Berlin Act on the Congo.9 Karen A. Mingst and Margaret P. 
                                                
6 David Lea, A political Chronology of Africa, (United Kingdom: Europa Publications, 2001) 104.  
7 David Lea 104.    
8 Mingst and Karns 18.  
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Karns note that one of the important factors of the Concert system had been the establishment of 
fundamental operations of international organizations, i.e. “multilateral consultation” (as in the 
colonial disputes in Africa), “and collective diplomacy,” mostly on the basis of the growing 
interdependence of European powers and their national interests.10 Subsequently, the conference 
legitimized Leopold’s conquest on a regional and international level and further extenuated his 
power over African property, which quickly attracted partnerships with private banks and 
companies to fund a desired and growing project.11 As a result, the Congo was raided, pillaged 
and scourged with violence in an internationally legitimized conquest for wealth.  
King Leopold named his property l’Etat Indépendent du Congo or the Congo Free State; 
a superficial designation to the least and an irony all its own, the Congo Free State became the 
forefront of Leopold’s exploitation tactfully legitimized through the Concert system. The brutal 
enslavement and labor of Congo natives commenced in 1890, paving the way for a massive rail 
system and the extraction and deportation of ivory, rubber, and other desired commodities.12 
International demand for rubber increased dramatically with the invention of the motorcar, thus, 
in 1890, 100 tons of rubber was exported from the Congo, and by 1901 6,000 tons was exported. 
Leopold continued exploiting the Congo through harsh methods of forced labor and mass 
killings until political and territorial ownership of his enterprise was annexed to the Belgian 
government in 1904 as a result of international uproar over such methods.13 The brutal treatment 
of the Congolese violated international human rights law that would not exist until after World 
War II, as established by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Leopoldian enterprise 
chastised the black Congolese as inferior and subhuman and it was in this chastisement where 
                                                                                                                                                       
9  Ch. Didier Gondola, The History of Congo (New York: Greenwood Press, 2002) 76.  
10 Mingst and Karns 18.  
11 Martin Meredith 95.   
12 Martin Meredith 96.  
13 Ch. Didier Gondola 77.  
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the hypocrisy originated. The international consensus under the Concert system acknowledged 
the African as savage and uncivilized, and it became the AIC’s duty to rid the Congolese of this 
savagery and enlighten the darkness of the Congo. Conversely, the Congolese property was 
pillaged and exploited at the hands of nearly 10 million Congolese lives. The heart of darkness 
was born and the European savagery continued after Leopold’s death.  
 
Belgium’s Colonial Congo:   
Belgium’s colonial state soon took power in 1908 and ushered in an era of stricter 
policies of racial subjugation that removed an emergence of a black elite.14 The transition to 
power signaled very little change in the management of the Congo as a colonial state and 
colonial opposition manifested itself amongst the local population. An increase in international 
demand for Congo's resources required efficient infrastructure to transport the resources into 
international markets and therefore, forced labor remained the dominant practice. However, 
amidst the increasing importance of the Congo’s commodities and the onset of World War I, 
social and political movements emerged as a weakening Belgium reorganized the administration 
within the Congo. In 1926, eight years after the end of World War I, Belgium gave the 
administrative power of the colony to the indigenous chiefs in efforts to achieve more 
cooperation within the state.15 Although this granted slight autonomy to the Congolese, the new 
administrative system was meant to provide Belgian forces with greater control.16 This signaled 
Belgium’s recognition of a changing political atmosphere, which was a necessary precursor to 
the eventual secession of the Congo as Belgian property. World War I had serious consequences 
for Europe’s many colonies; however, a bigger problem was on the horizon. Germany’s 
                                                
14 Ch. Didier Gondola 79.   
15 Ch. Didier Gondola 79.  
16 Ch. Didier Gondola 80.   
 14 
increasing aggression and power over European states marked the end to multilateral practices 
and in 1940; Belgium officially entered the worsening international conflict.  
For nearly three decades, Belgium ruled the Congo under an administrative system that 
operated under three important and influential actors: the Belgian state, Christian missions that 
provided education and westernization of the population, and big financial institutions that were 
allowed to exploit the Congo’s minerals in exchange for infrastructure building.17 The actual 
implementation of infrastructure building was limited to essential transportation methods for the 
efficient movement of exploited resources, i.e. roads, railways and river ports. The private 
companies ignored the building of schools, hospitals, and other important structures unless it 
supported the efforts of the many workers exporting resources. The African was therefore, 
subhuman and undeserving of basic human needs. World War II drastically increased the export 
of rubber and valuable minerals causing a massive rural migration to industrial urban centers, 
which changed the demographics of the Congo. Nonetheless, World War II came to an end in 
1945 and the change that followed throughout the international system profoundly determined 
the fate of Africa, as colonial powers such as Britain and France relinquished their political and 
economic ownership of their colonial claims. There were many economic and political 
implications for the Congo considering its importance to international economic markets.  
 
Political Factionalization in the 1950’s and the Civil War from 1960 -1965 
The end of the war brought extensive political change as a black elite emerged in the 
Congo’s prospering economy and in 1950, this culminated into the Alliance des Bakango 
(ABAKO), which was founded in the Congo’s capital, Leopoldville, and led by Joseph 
                                                
17 Ch. Didier Gondola 86.   
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Kasavubu.18 The rise of “normative” international law greatly affected the colonial masters of 
Africa, the Middle East, South America, and parts of Asia. The devastating effects of World War 
II and the resulting formation of the United Nations greatly affected international relations by 
building an idealism that claimed legitimacy in the international system. This movement was not 
limited to the Congo, but was a continental shift in African politics driven by the post World War 
II international system and also affected by colonial properties outside the African continent, 
such as India’s independence from Great Britain in 1947.  
By 1952, the Congolese could choose to undergo a process of “immatriculation” that 
assured they had been westernized sufficiently and attained an understanding of European laws 
while disavowing their own indigenous laws.19 Subsequently, the 1950s ushered in many 
political reforms that permitted the Congolese to own land in rural and urban localities, access to 
public institutions, the right to buy alcohol, in 1957 the right to elect members to urban councils, 
and in 1958 the right to trial through all courts of law and not only indigenous tribunals.20 It is no 
wonder then that Congolese political elites began to form antigovernment political groups amidst 
an apparent liberalization of Congolese society. In 1956, the political shift was so vast that 
political opposition groups, such as the ABAKO, distributed a manifesto that demanded 
independence from Belgium, while the formation of the Mouvement Nationale Congolais (MNC) 
announced an agenda of national unity and emancipation.21 Anti-European rioting and widening 
support of political change erupted throughout 1959, and on January 13, King Badouin of 
Belgium declared a policy of decolonization.22  
                                                
18 David Lea 105.   
19 David Lea 105.   
20 David Lea 105.  
21 David Lea 105.  
22 David Lea 105  
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Regardless, the official end to Belgium’s rule of the Congo manifested itself in the 
creation of hundreds of political and ethnic factions reaching for power within the new 
government. As Joseph-Desire Mobutu replaced the Belgian Chief of Staff of the armed forces, 
the United Nations Security Council commanded all Belgian forces to leave the Congo after 
violence erupted against Belgian nationals.23 Elections were held for the central government and 
Lumumba and his party, the MNC, won a majority of seats giving him the position of Prime 
Minister. Kasavubu was elected president and a month later on June 30, 1960 the Republic of 
Congo gained sovereignty and independence from Belgium.24 Importantly, the Belgians had 
established six provincial governments with almost equal power as the central government and 
when the Belgians left the Congo, a power struggle ensued between them.25 Political strife and 
riots erupted throughout the regions as the newly elected officials were faced with constituents 
that lacked experience and training.26 Prime Minister Lumumba was later accused of selling the 
country to the Soviet Union and was thrown from his position as Prime Minister by President 
Kasavubu, and the developed and mineral-wealthy Katanga region seceded, and a civil war 
ensued.27 It is important to note the involvement of the Cold War in the Congo as “it was the first 
black African country into whose affairs (originally quite legitimately through the United 
Nations) the USSR would intervene.28   
This resulted in greater factionalization as Lumumba created a rebel government that 
resulted in a political stalemate.29 Lumumba was eventually arrested a year later in 1961 as a 
                                                
23 David Lea 106.  
24 David Lea 106.  
25 Guy Arnold, Historical Dictionary of Civil Wars in Africa, Historical Dictionaries of War, Revolution,
 and Civil Unrest, Volume 12, The Scarecrow Press, London 1999, 93.  
26 Guy Arnold 93.  
27 Guy Arnold 94.  
28 Buy Arnold 94.  
29 David Lea 106.
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traitor to the state and assassinated with his former deputies shortly after.30 Lumumba was a 
tremendous figure in Congolese politics as he published several manifestos and books urging for 
a Congo free from colonial rule. The Secretary General of the UN Dag Hammarskjöld’s plane 
crashed on his way to negotiate an end to the secession and immediately following, UN forces 
ended the Katanga secession in 1963.31 Nonetheless, the UN later concluded that the situation in 
the Congo had deteriorated dangerously, and strongly urged Kasavubu’s government and the 
MNC to begin reconciliation negotiations; a task that was easier said than done. However, over a 
several month period, the government negotiated with the MNC and a new government was 
formed in August 1961; yet in December 1962, a little more than a year later, UN forces fired on 
police in Katanga and violence quickly erupted as the Prime Minister claimed an act of 
aggression and violence.32 The Civil War continued and ravaged the fragile political system and 
institutions that the Belgians had left.  
Between December 1962 and January 1965, the political strife and factionalization 
continued, the UN removed its entire mission from the Congo, rebellions increased, a new 
constitution was approved creating a federalist presidential system, the Congo was renamed the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Belgian and US troops aided Katangan forces during 
a rebellion.33 The Cold War greatly increased the involvement of US policies and USSR 
aggression. More importantly, the Congolese formed a very democratic government; however, 
great power still resided in President Kasavubu and his constant dismissal of senior officials in 
                                                
30 Edouard Bustin, Remembrance of Sins Past: Unraveling the Murder of Patrice Lumumba, Review of 
African Political Economy, Vol. 29, State Failure in the Congo: Perceptions and Realities, Taylor and 
Francis Ltd. 2002. Many sources will disagree on who actually killed Lumumba on February 13, 1961; 
however, it is widely believed that Katanga separatists were responsible. In 1999, the Belgian government 
reopened the case of Lumumba’s assassination do to the publishing of Jacques Brassine’s doctoral 
dissertation on his experience with the Katanga separatists. He argues that Belgium and the United States, 
through the CIA, were responsible for the assassination of Lumumba.  
31 Guy Arnold 95.  
32 David Lea 107.  
33 David Lea 107.   
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his regime created tension throughout the government system.34 Kasavubu’s power would end 
soon after when in November 1965, Colonel Mobutu, “who was supported by the military 
claimed full executive powers and announced a ‘Second Republic’ as the legislature approved 
his move and granted him such powers for five years do to a ‘state of emergency.’35 The Civil 
War Officially ended and the DRC would soon undergo major changes under Mobutu’s regime.  
 
Mobutu’s Totalitarian Regime, 1965 – 1997  
 
 The vast movements of the 1960s represented a conflicting period in the domestic 
political sphere of the Congo, and also challenged a UN system increasingly weakened by the 
Cold War and the European decolonization campaign. By increasingly bipolarizing the 
international system, the Cold War sparked a new imperialism based on an ideological 
dichotomy, territorial acquisition and a nuclear arms program on both sides. Yet, the rise of 
Mobutu’s military dictatorship as an undemocratic and politically polarizing system continued 
without US objections. Rather, Mobutu’s dictatorship developed a close-knit relationship with 
the US and other Western powers, owing to the Cold War proxy agenda and the economic 
prospects within the Congo. Although political scientists have deemed the Congo a military 
dictatorship, for the sake of accuracy, the Congo during Mobutu was a totalitarian regime 
according to Peta Ikambana. Ikambana defines totalitarianism as such:  
“Totalitarianism is a philosophical, political, and/or ideological doctrine 
that confines the totality of national life within a monolithic power style 
and vision of the world.”36 
 
Even within the confines of this definition, African totalitarianism, a product of the deep cultural 
differences from Western society, is defined more generally as a political system that fails to 
                                                
34 David Lea 107.  
35 David Lea 108. 
36 Peta Ikambana, Mobutu’s Totalitarian Political System: An Afrocentric Analysis (Taylor & Francis
 Group, New York, NY, 2007) 3.   
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promote or foster the well-being of the African people.37 However, Mobutu’s policies of 
authenticating the state by changing the ‘Westernized’ city names and the name of the state to 
indigenous origins is unique in African polities and exemplifies Mobutu’s distaste of Europe’s 
inquisition and influence.38 Several years after taking power and regaining absolute control over 
the state in 1971 under a single party system known as the Mouvement Populaire de la 
Révolution (MPR), Mobutu renamed the Congo the Republic of Zaire.39 According to Michael 
Nest, as apparent throughout Zaire’s history beginning with Belgian rule, Mobutu’s government 
distributed land and citizenship rights through ethnic selection and their connected communities, 
and therefore, ethnic conflicts over access to resources continued all throughout Mobutu’s 
regime.40 His methods became known as Mobutuism, and would continue to rule Zaire for 
several years to come, and any deviation from this was considered a constitutional offense.41 The 
treachery of Mobutu was his ascendance to an African King Leopold II.  
  “The creation of a political network based on patrimonialism, which worked by 
  satisfying the private interests of those involved, led to widespread corruption 
  within the state bureaucracy and contributed to economic malaise.”42 
 
Private enterprises, factories and basic capital were seized (nearly 2,000 foreign owned alone), 
became state owned, and eventually were redistributed to Mobutu’s family members, close 
friends and many others as an insurance on their support of his regime.43 But Mobutu had no 
worries for the West vehemently supported his regime. This support would continue for decades 
amidst apparent factionalization of the state. Mobutu was an irrational man filled with greed 
amidst tens of millions of Congolese citizens, ravaged by poverty and the dark skeletal remains 
                                                
37 Peta Ikambana 3.  
38 David Lea 109.   
39 David Lea 109.  
40 Michael Nest, The Democratic Republic of Congo: Economic Dimensions of War and Peace
 (International Peace Academy, Inc., Lynn  Publishers, United Kingdom, 2006) 13.  
41 Martin Meredith 295.   
42 Michael Nest …?   
43 Martin Meredith 297.   
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of Belgium’s colonialism. Notwithstanding, a darker period awaited sub-Saharan Africa, putting 
to test once more the will of the international community.   
 
Transition to Democracy, Genocide in Rwanda and the Continental War 
The end of the Cold War and the receding interests of the US eventually beckoned a 
reluctant and weakening Mobutu to transition Zaire to a democracy. This reluctance was 
demonstrated in his efforts to stifle student protestors and on May 11th, 1990, 150 students were 
killed during a protest to end Zaire’s totalitarian regime.44 Historically, increasingly weakening 
dictatorships supported by harsh authoritarians rely on their military to quiet any opposition, 
typically by targeting college youth whose political activism challenges the system. However, 
the aggressive regime has rarely sustained its governmental system after the violence has 
occurred, not to mention it has not maintained a weakening dictator. For example, in Argentina 
between 1976 and 1983, some 10,000 – 30,000 people disappeared as the authoritarian regime 
struggled to silence any opposition.45 Although the process of reconciliation was slow, 
nonetheless, accountability internationally and within the Argentine state progressed as 
democratic motivation ensued years later. Zaire, however, was far more complicated as 
Mobutu’s influence was drastically decreasing in the country. However, Mobutu eventually 
conceded to a democratic transition and in August 1990, thousands of delegates from around the 
country convened at the Sovereign National Conference (CNS).46 Problems with the democratic 
transition were inevitable as the severely multipolar domestic politics produced hundreds of 
political parties. Ch. Didier Gondola wrote that within the 200 political parties, long-time 
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opponents who often returned to Zaire from exile led several of these.47 The next four years 
ushered in a period of chaos as militarily-equipped factions attacked villages and carried out 
violent protests throughout Kinshasa.48 However, a darker period in international relations would 
soon conflagrate across the border of Zaire.  
Once again, Africa plunged deeper into darkness when in Rwanda in 1994, the 
government ruled Hutu majority attacked and slaughtered the Tutsi minority. It would seem that 
the international response would have been immediate given the harsh realities of the Holocaust; 
however, national interests would once again find its place in humanitarian intervention. The 
crisis tested the will of the supposed international community; however, a community of the 
unwilling allowed nearly 800,000 Tutsis to be butchered. This was not a simple case of interstate 
conflict, keeping only inside the sovereign boundaries of Rwanda, but rather it was a large case 
of cross-border pandemonium as hundreds of thousands of refugees poured into Zaire, the 
majority of which were former Hutu genocidaires. According to Adam Lebor, Mobutu allowed 
the Hutu’s to settle in refugee camps in the summer of 1994, after much of the butchery had been 
done; however, many of the Hutu’s kept their weapons.49 Eventually, the Hutu’s reassembled 
themselves, took control of the refugee camps welcomed by Mobutu and funded by the 
international community, and began slaughtering the Congolese Tutsi.50 The violence spread 
quickly as Eastern Zaire was ravaged of its resources and cleansed of any aggressors to the rebel 
factions.  
The impact of the Rwandan genocide conflagrated into a massive refugee movement into 
Zaire, and eventually lead to the destabilization of central Africa sparking the second Congo war 
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and the eventual continental war that would kill millions of people. Eastern Zaire became the 
most affected, as nearly 1.2 million refugees (mostly Rwandan Hutu civilians and nearly 50 
thousand Hutu genocidaires) poured into the crumbling state.51 Mobutu’s government did 
nothing to stop the violence in Eastern Zaire and his government continued to collapse as 
Lawrence Kabila’s Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (French 
acronym AFDL) began to gain momentum.52 Astonishingly, after decades of support for 
Mobutu’s totalitarian regime, the US claimed immediate support of Kabila’s movement and the 
international community followed suite, regardless of Kabila’s less democratic tendencies.53 
Eventually in 1997, Kabila’s military power marched into Kinshasa and overtook the 
government as Mobutu escaped into asylum and eventually died later that year in Morocco.54 A 
new dictatorship was born under Kabila and vast human rights violations would continue in 
Eastern Zaire (renamed the DRC). Kabila disliked the ethnic Hutu’s and eventually, reports that 
nearly 200,000 Hutu refugees (including innocent civilians and Hutu genocidaires) went missing 
were denied by his government.55  
It is alleged that thousands of these refugees were massacred in the refugee camps, others 
disappeared completely, and many made it onto special airlift operations organized by the UN 
and repatriated back into Rwanda.56 In August 2008, the second Congolese war began owing to 
Kabila’s decision to “expel the Rwandan military officers who had helped him topple Mobutu a 
year before.”57 Military mobilization by seven African countries split the DRC into four sections, 
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where each section relied on its own resources.58 Kabila’s government fell and shortly thereafter, 
he was assassinated.59 The continental war was underway and millions of lives would be lost 
during the violence. Yet, astonishingly, the international community remained ignorant to the 
violence as international media reported virtually nothing for two years until MONUC was 
mandated and international aid began to flow in. Importantly, a lot of the political backlash 
during the Rwandan genocide originated from the thousands of reports and pictures being 
broadcast to a sensitive western audience. Regardless of an apparent CNN effect in Rwanda, no 
such effect existed during the DRC crisis, which may have helped fuel a greater international 
response to the situation. Nonetheless, this begs the question of what the international 
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A Dichotomy In International Relations  
 
“I turned to the wilderness...And for a moment it seemed to me as if I also was buried in a vast 
grave full of unspeakable secrets. I felt an intolerable weight oppressing my breast, the smell of 
the damp earth, the unseen presence of victorious corruption, the darkness of an impenetrable 
night.”60 
   
-- Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness 
 
Cosmopolitanism vs. Realism and the DRC:  
 
 International relations scholarship has primarily focused on two dichotomous archetypes 
known as liberalism and realism. According to Patrick Hayden, in the past century, liberalism 
has developed a cosmopolitan answer to global issues, i.e. the formation of the League of 
Nations system and the modern UN system. Cosmopolitan global politics focuses primarily on 
the supremacy of human beings absent the national identity of these persons.61 There are two 
forms of cosmopolitanism in international relations theory: moral and legal, which both are 
necessary to give substance to world citizenship (refer to Figure 1.1).62 Moral cosmopolitanism 
assumes a universal foundation that all persons, across international borders, are equal and the 
fundamental concern in international politics.63 Legal cosmopolitanism maintains that 
international political order must be constructed to ensure a foundation for the moral universality 
of persons.64 Therefore, moral obligations arise when a person’s rights are violated, and proper 
enforcement may claim legitimacy in such circumstances, i.e. when a state or group is in direct 
violation of human rights. Patrick Hayden defines this ‘ongoing’ pursuit as a ‘cosmopolitan 
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ethicopolitical’ project, and thus, it is appropriate within the confines of this analysis.65 
Heretofore, a basic level of analysis for cosmopolitanism has been constructed and will remain 
as such throughout this paper; nevertheless, and begs the question, why is the UN utilized as an 
example of cosmopolitan ethics given its reliance on state sovereignty?                
 The conventional idealism harnessed in cosmopolitanism has several weaknesses 
considering the present state of national identification in the modern international system. 
Although the theory itself as an agency for a global community is abstract and ambiguous, it 
establishes an ethical base for how universal 
human equality should be approached, and at 
a subliminal level, it is harnessed within 
international organizations (the UN), and the 
presence of international legal foundations, 
such as the UN Charter, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, etc. 
Additionally, global citizenship has been 
harnessed by the “convergence of globalization, global governance and global civil society,” and 
therefore it has an existing prevalence in theoretical investigations.66 The UN is the most affable 
tool for the human rights regime because of its contract with the global community at large for 
such normative values. Cosmopolitan substantiation comes directly from the UN system because 
it interjects its universality through international legal doctrines, and enforces its charter through 
the Security Council. It therefore becomes contingent for its supranational nature to succumb to 
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state interests, as its charter is limited to state sovereignty. To better explain this general impact 
on cosmopolitan idealism, an analysis of realism is necessary.  
 Realism is the most prevalent theoretical bases for analyzing international relations 
amongst states. International Realism is the theory that states are motivated by competition to 
increase their sovereign power in a system of anarchy, where no enforceable ‘world government’ 
exists to check state interests. From Thucydides’ “The Melian Dialogue” to Noccolò 
Machiavelli’s “The Prince” and to more modern theorists such as Thomas Hobbes in “The State 
of Nature and the State of War,” and Kenneth Waltz’s neorealist conception of war, realism 
stands in constant ambiguity (ambiguous according to Robert Crawford who contests the validity 
of international relations as a practice)67 and criticism as it attempts to substantiate itself in a 
post-Cold War international system. Yet, this tension more notably became tangible in the post-
World War I international arena as neoliberalism attempted international order through the 
League of Nations system. Although realism found consilience and justifiability for its 
theoretical assumptions during the Cold War balance of power between the United States and the 
USSR, it has suffered from, what I will call, the post-Cold War revalidation of idealism. 
Nonetheless, amidst staunch criticism and theoretical adjudication from liberal scholars, how 
does the DRC support or delineate from realism? Can realism help us understand the DRC case, 
or is the theory itself disproven through the revalidation of the post-WWII idealism, i.e. 
liberalism?  
 The best way to analyze cosmopolitanism and realism in conjunction with events in the 
DRC is to analyze international legal doctrines, MONUC’s mandate and its implementation, and 
the economic relationship between the United States and China (the current economic contenders 
                                                
67 Robert M.A. Crawford, Idealism and Realism in International Relations: Beyond the Discipline:
 (Routledge Advances in International Relations and Politics, New York, NY, 2000) Preface.   
 27 
on the world stage). International legal doctrines thrive from the willingness of states to sign 
treaties that establish a jurisprudential base for state action. They also provide basic rights across 
international borders in an ideal attempt to prompt intervention and/or an ethical code of 
conduct. The UN Charter is the most substantial document in cosmopolitan ethics, as it 
establishes an order by which states must abide within a global community; however, it is 
weakened by the Westphalian realism of sovereignty and territorial integrity. There is no proper 
enforcement of the UN Charter unless states agree to provide such support. However, at the 
subliminal level, what is the nature of the UN Charter and how does it connect with international 
ethics?  
 
The UN Charter: 
The UN Charter contains a few elements that support an ethical base for international 
human equality. For example, Article I, Section 2 and 3 state in conjunction with the purposes 
and principles of the UN: 
2.    To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take 
other appropriate measure to strengthen universal peace; 
 
3.    To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems 
of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in 
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion...68 
 
Immediately however, it is clear that the language used leaves plenty of room for lackadaisical 
action; that is, by using words such as ‘promote’ and ‘encourage,’ the UN only means to uphold 
international human rights at a diluted level. This is not the ideal language of a cosmopolitan 
theorist; however, the language does exist on a basic level and therefore, states should have the 
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capacity to promote such principles on a heightened level. Importantly, Article 1, Section 2 and 3 
provides for arguments in international ethics and what states ought to do in humanitarian 
situation. According to Jean-Marc Coicaud and Daniel Warner, ethics concerns itself with 
attaining the highest idea “of what it is to be a human being.”69 Fundamentally, this “ethical 
dimension of responsibility” works with the idea of choice, and because the world’s poor cannot 
possibly choose or influence the ethical progress of international ethics, powerful person’s and 
wealthy states can and therefore, must use their power to enhance international ethics for the 
“powerless.”70 The major weakness in the UN Charter comes from Article 2, Section 1 where:  
1.    The Organization is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all 
its members.71 
 
Therefore, this creates a dilemma for humanitarian intervention, especially on the level of the 
DRC, as a division of duty arises from states that have the right to maximize the safety of their 
sovereignty before another’s, yet the UN Charter does not hard-line humanitarian intervention. 
This is based on the reports of the Secretary General to the Security Council. Nonetheless, the 
UN Charter shortly outlines a base for international ethics and assumes that all persons across 
borders are fundamentally equal.  
The UN Charter does not definitively outline the sovereign rights of human beings at a 
true cosmopolitan level, but rather a sub-cosmopolitan level. Fundamental human rights must be 
understood from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is a non-treaty international 
human rights instrument based on agreement from states. In regards to the DRC, the UN 
provides humanitarian aid in the form of peacekeeping, which establishes an ethical base for a 
collapsed state, but also a basis for international law in other state disputes. Jean-Marc and 
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Daniel Warner note that the scope and restrictions of international ethics have to be 
conceptualized on the “structure of the international realm...[and] a central feature of this 
structure, lies in the limits of the experience of identification with others and of the extension of 
the sense of community.”72 They also note that ethnicity and religiosity on a national level 
already pose significant problems, therefore, such differences at an international level present an 
even greater issue.73 As stated before, many of Africa’s problems extended from the arbitrary 
and racist division of state borders and territorial claims. Most especially, the DRC suffered from 
this arbitrariness. However affable the UN is as the subject of cosmopolitan ethics, the weakness 
of the UN as an agency for the human rights regime extends directly from its enforceable power, 
which is the Security Council. Nonetheless, examining the Security Council mandate for 
MONUC before criticizing its weaknesses will provide a greater understanding of its legitimacy.  
 
Examining MONUC: 
 The best way to understand how the ‘international community’ has responded to the 
disaster in the DRC and to understand fully where the international system lies, either in a 
cosmopolitan idealism or a realist conception of national interest, is to briefly analyze the UN’s 
most effective tool in international disputes of this magnitude: peacekeeping. How tangible is the 
UN mandate for the vast complexities in the DRC and what have states done to relieve the 
human suffering? More importantly, what are the implications of events in the DRC for how we 
think about the UN and the notion of an “international community?” The mandate made clear 
that the disaster in the DRC constituted a threat to international peace and security in the African 
region. However, the mandate itself took several years and resolutions to reach a more capable 
level. At the onset, MONUC only consisted of 5,537 military personnel, including 500 
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observers.74 Today, the total force consists of 20,573 military personnel, the largest UN mission 
in the world (see Figure 1.2). The UN has been monitoring the disaster in the Congo since 1997, 
yet the persistent humanitarian disaster has been virtually unchanged. The initial mandate lacked 
the proper enforcement power, as was made clear in 2002 and 2003 as reports emerged that UN 
forces sat by as hundreds of civilians were slaughtered outside its bases.75 A simple change in the 
mandate authorizing protective measures of civilians using weapons would have prevented these 
deaths; however, the UN would have been supporting the human right to life, and not the respect 
of state sovereignty. The biggest argument about MONUC is the lack of military experts, which 
many of MONUC’s chiefs agreed was necessary to deter the violence early on in the 
implementation of the mandate.76 Nonetheless, MONUC started the mission on a bad foot, as 
The Economist reported; many of the rebel militias mocked the UN troops, as they believed the 
blue helmets would do nothing to stop them, which inevitably weekend their presence in the 
country.77  
The mandate, having been approved by the UN Security Council, has persistently adapted 
to the problems in the Congo; however, this adaptation often came too late, as the legitimacy of 
UN forces could not compete with the unpredictable rebel factions. The most important mission 
for any peacekeeping operation is to support the transitional government with free and fair 
democratic elections, supply logistics to the UN military personnel and the allied government, 
build proper infrastructure (such as schools, roads, water facilities, hospitals, transportation etc.), 
and to deter human rights violations. Because peacekeeping missions are relative to the areas in 
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which they are deployed, a universal implementation of mandates is impossible, as cultural and 
ethnic affiliations differ across borders. Nonetheless, MONUC’s mandate stipulates, “Ensure the 
protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel, under imminent threat of physical 
violence, in particular violence emanating from any of the parties engaged in the conflict.”78 
MONUC has failed at this stipulation given the persistent violations of human rights that plague 








To affirm this failure, studies have shown that the DRC claims the title as the world 
capital of rape, torture and mutilation with a death rate of 45,000 a month as of 2010, mostly due 
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to disease and lack of infrastructure in tandem with the destructive capacity of decades of war 
(see Figure 1.3).79 Yet, amidst the disastrous humanitarian plight, the credibility of MONUC is at 
disastrous levels as reports by the Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) in 
2008 claimed that MONUC forces were selling back weapons seized by the UN disarmament 
period.80 Although the legitimacy of these claims may have ulterior motives for the FDLR, the 
implication of these accusations further dilutes the effectiveness of MONUC’s operation.  
 
 
BBC Worldwide Monitoring reported similar accusations claiming that the Democratic 
Republic of Congo Armed Forces (FARDC) came to MONUC to assist in Rwandan repatriation, 
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but were instead sent to Kisangani and tortured by the Senegalese commander of MONUC.81 Not 
to mention that both of these reports had linkage to minerals being used in the negotiation 
process, demonstrating the sheer demand for these commodities on an aggregate level, and their 
effectiveness in negotiations with aggressors. Although the groups that alleged them may have 
fabricated these reports, the impact is enormous as MONUC attempts to calm tensions between 
rebels and the transitional government. MONUC became a less objective bystander to the local 
population, damaging MONUC’s credibility. It is clear that the MONUC’s mission was 
compromised from the beginning, yet years after the start of its mandate, the UN mission has 
failed to reiterate its legitimacy, and therefore will continue to grapple with sustaining a country 
ravaged by imperialism, Mobutuism and a civil war trapped within a continental war. The 
biggest success of MONUC has been its support during the April 2006 elections, where Joseph 
Kabila was pronounced president in the first multiparty elections in more than 45 years, yet the 
increase in Congolese refugees has created further troubles for MONUC (see Figure 1.4).82 
Notwithstanding, the persistent attacks by the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army, the most 
notorious rebel group in Africa, have continued but with increased measures by MONUC to rid 
them from Congo. The Lord’s Resistance Army is responsible for massacring thousands of 
Congolese, not to mention the systematic rape of women.83 As recent as March 2010, massive 
rape, murders and kidnapping occurred in northern villages in the DRC as a US backed Ugandan 
army has been remotely successful in weeding them out of the DRC.84  
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Conclusively, the violence has continued regardless of MONUC’s mission, amidst 
international efforts to cleanse the DRC of rebel groups that have pillaged minerals, raped 
hundreds of thousands, and murdered countless innocent Congolese for broken agendas. 
MONUC has thus far been a failure for the DRC, not to say its presence has done nothing 
positive. From the onset of the mission, MONUC’s mandate lacked legitimacy and the tools 
necessary for such an aggravated situation, not to mention a UN Charter bogged down by the 
incendiary interests of states. Amidst the violence, what are the DRC’s relations with China and 
the US and what more can these relations tell us about international ethics and the DRC? 
Figure 1.4 
 Refugee Population, 1990 – 2008   Source: World Bank 
 
 
The UN Security Council: A Weakness or an Imperative? 
 The legitimacy of the Security Council comes from the veto power of its five permanent 
members, China, the US, Great Britain, France and Russia. Fundamentally, states have the right 
to pursue their own interests and self-determine through foreign policy objectives, i.e. to respond 
to possible threats, declare war, practice diplomacy etc; Joseph Nye defines the national interest 
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as “the set of shared priorities regarding relations with the rest of the world.”85 However, the 
post-WWII international system was meant to be less Westphalian, where states rely on hard-
power diplomacy, and more cosmopolitan, where states rely on economic and cultural 
integration, and also where an international assembly of peaceful discourse (the UN) provides 
such a space for this objective. Yet, the ascendance of genocide in the 1990s and the DRC case 
after the Cold War has greatly challenged this cosmopolitan ideal, and offered a far more 
Westphalian state centrism in explaining the weakness of the human rights regime. The great 
power unanimity, or the veto power, of the Security Council invariably interjects the national 
interests of the permanent members into the so-called ‘democratic’ voting process. For instance, 
it becomes inevitable for states, which hold greater power than rotating members, to cost-benefit 
analysis or weigh their national interests with peace efforts.  
The international response to the increasing genocidal violence in Rwanda in 1994, the 
stalled response to Bosnia-Herzegovina and the DRC case represent an increasingly familiar 
dilemma for the Security Council. Additionally, the most pungent and modern example of state 
interests interceding in peace efforts arose in 2002. The United States vetoed an extension to the 
Bosnia peacekeeping mission because the International Criminal Court denied the United States’ 
demand that American peacekeepers be exempt from its jurisprudence.86 This exemplified the 
intransigent nature of power politics and its influence on the UN’s abilities to continue peace 
efforts. Fundamentally, the violence in Bosnia at the time was claiming human lives, yet the 
United States once again put its national interests above peace. The Security Council failed 
because of the weakness of MONUC’s mandate not because it failed to pass anything. However, 
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other international political forces have been at work in the DRC. The US and China have played 
extremely important roles in African restructuring; however, one economic giant has been less 
helpful than the other in the political and economic restructuring of the DRC. The Security 
Council has been more of a weakness than an imperative in international peace and security.  
 
The United States and China: 
 The rise of China as an economic power has been quite recent on the world stage, yet the 
state has done a lot to ensure it prospers in the future, most notoriously its economic relations 
with African states. Lydia Polgreen writes in the New York Times that China’s risky investment 
in Africa has filled a void left by Western companies unwilling to risk investment in the fragile 
states of Africa.87 At a subliminal level, Chinese investment in the risky continent offers a  
“complete economic and political alternative to the heavily conditioned aid and economic 
restructuring that Western countries and international aid agencies pressed on Arica for years.”88 
This paradigm seems ideal considering the West’s recurring attempts to restructure the political 
atmosphere of African states; however, a more realist motive behind China’s investments are 
clear.  
It was in 2007 that China made a deal with the DRC to offer $9 billion for developing 
important infrastructure (nearly nine times the MONUC’s monetary budget for 2010) in 
exchange for access to its vast mineral wealth such as cobalt, copper, tin and gold.89 However 
ideal this agreement seems, Polgreen notes that the mineral exchange is a mere loan to China 
against future revenues, and all of this was happening as the International Monetary Fund 
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decided to write-off the DRC’s vast debt.90 Invariably, the DRC is being forgiven of one debt, 
but accruing another. It is clear that China is ensuring their national economic interest while 
crippling the DRC’s hopes for a prosperous future. International exports from the DRC as of 
2008 offer a greater understanding of China’s relations compared with other states (see Figure 
1.5). Additionally, amidst the increasingly desperate conditions in the DRC, China’s exports 
have increased dramatically (see Figure 1.6). It is clear that China’s interest in the DRC have not 
contributed to the economic and political stability in Africa; however, the interests of China are 
met at an increasing rate. Polgreen writes that the Congo remains in shambles politically and 
economically, yet the current demands of production from China to meet its resource deal with 
the DRC are far behind.91  
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Figure 1.6 
China's Imports from Democratic Republic of Congo from 2004 to October 2009 











China’s interests in the DRC exemplify a realist approach to its international affairs, as it 
pays no attention to the economic and political consequences in the DRC, but rather, the 
expansion of its own interests.92 Jonathan Fenby notes that as China lends to Africa, “Chinese 
banks pay no heed to the Equator Principles backed by the World Bank, under which countries 
undertake to respect human rights and environmental standards in return for loans.”93 Figure 1.5 
demonstrates the dominance of China in the DRC and the US’ miniscule influence, as the US 
puts far more funding into aid and political restructuring rather than resource extraction. 
Relations between the US and the DRC are complicated but positive. According to the US 
Department of State, the US claims a strong role in the peace process in the DRC and validates 
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these claims by playing a huge role in the UN’s efforts to create a “Joint Verification mechanism 
to monitor the border between the DRC and Rwanda” (where most of the violence continues).94 
Most importantly, in 2008, the US created the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), 
which “in concert with other US Agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security 
engagement through military-to-military programs” and activities to promote African security in 
tandem with US foreign policy.95 In the DRC, AFRICOM has begun training light infantry 
Battalions to help shape the future Congolese military.96  
Conclusively, US relations with the DRC remain humanitarian with a large support for 
international efforts to reconcile the war-torn state. Although it may seem that China is 
completely self-interested, the economic giant provides peacekeeping troops to MONUC in a 
step to allure the international community into believing it seeks reconciliation in the world’s 
murder capitol. Nonetheless, amidst the scholarship in international relations and the concept of 
an international community, the most pressing question yet to be answered is what is the most 
tangible state of international relations by examining the DRC case?  It is clear that power 
politics still exist in the international community, yet is there a semblance of cosmopolitan 
idealism? Western states persistently invoke humanitarian law, which states are expected to 
adhere to; however, when states violate these principles for economic gain (as seen by China), it 
seems the international community can do very little to stop the violence from reaching the 
levels seen in the DRC. The paradox in the DRC is its vast mineral wealth, yet the country 
remains in shambles. The DRC must claim ownership over their resources, whether it be through 
state owned enterprises backed by hard military power, or through increased efforts by 
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international corporations doing business in the DRC to take greater measures in ensuring 
transparency. The United States and the UN are major political actors in restructuring the DRC, 












































The Heart of Darkness 
 
“Conflicts of interest between man and man are resolved, in principle, by the recourse to 
violence. It is the same in the animal kingdom, from which man cannot claim exclusion...”97 
 
--Sigmund Freud, Why War? 
 
Conclusions: 
What has been presented thus far in this analysis is a more clear conception of 
cosmopolitanism and realism in international relations. Equivalently, the UN Charter, MONUC, 
and US and China relations with the DRC have also been reported. However, questions remain 
unanswered and therefore, a conclusive analysis is appropriate. As stated before, legal 
cosmopolitanism maintains that international political order must be constructed to ensure a 
foundation for the moral universality of persons.98 This conception cannot be supported by the 
DRC case for a few reasons. Firstly, there exists an ideational realm where human value is based 
on the sovereigns gain and a manifested superiority abounds in nationalist identity, that is, the 
citizen of one state will feel more morally just than a citizen from another state. At a fundamental 
level, this explains the persistent lack of media coverage and an international acknowledgement 
of the continental war. 
Secondly, the current international law doctrines, such as the UN Charter and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, cannot possibly retain legitimacy in a UN system whose 
greatest tool for international peace, peacekeeping, has failed in the DRC case. These doctrines 
rely on state support without any tangible hard power intervention in the face of humanitarian 
law violations. States can simply ignore the situation by supporting MONUC’s mandate and 
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 42 
providing condemning language. Thirdly, the increasing death rate in the DRC amidst an already 
condemnable 5.4 to 7.8 million dead in tandem with China’s increasingly power hungry relations 
with the country (demonstrated in Figures 1.3, 1.5 and 1.6), substantiate a realist undertaking in 
international politics. Although China’s relations are realist in nature, the efforts from the US, 
such as AFRICOM and billions of dollars in aid, offer a less realist and more liberal approach to 
rebuilding the DRC. Nonetheless, the international community was virtually quiet during the 
initial breakdown of central Africa, supporting the idea that the international system remains in a 
realist construction. The political backlash in the US was apparent during the Rwandan genocide, 
which triggered the continental war years later; however, this backlash was not severe enough to 
cost President Clinton his presidency. Samantha Power’s notes that this has shaped US foreign 
policy in humanitarian disasters (such as genocide) as US president’s use positive language to 
stop genocide’s recurrence, nonetheless, in the face of its recurrence and US abstention, 
American political leaders are rarely effected enough to cost them their electoral pursuits.99 The 
dichotomous relationship between cosmopolitanism and realism remains clear (see Figure 1.7).  
What can be said of international law and ethics in the DRC case? The DRC exemplifies 
an ideological dilemma stemming from European inquisition, where African’s were subhuman. 
In today’s realm, this subhuman categorization maintains some of these elements, that is, western 
societies see individualism as a self-help system where persons make his or her own future. In 
other words, individuals who contract with a sovereign have an innate responsibility to persons 
within that state only (a Hobbesian understanding). This can explain the persistence in 
international aid as a colloquial alternative to hard-power military intervention, which in the 
DRC, would have prevented several million deaths as the rebel factions were often ill-equipped.  
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Regardless, human rights law has a much weaker foundation, given the DRC case. The 
institutionalized human rights regime cannot stop states, such as China, from seeking economic 
relationships during humanitarian disasters, even if this relationship undermines humanitarian 
efforts and economic restructuring. Jack Goldsmith notes in his book “The Limits of 
International Law” that in considering US patterns in human rights enforcement, the US has 
done “relatively little in the face of human rights abuses in Africa, where it lacks a strong 
strategic interest.”100 International human rights law cannot expect reasonable enforcement and 
respect from powerful states unless a national interest is present. Yet, how does this explain 
                                                
100 Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford Press, New York, 2005)
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positive US initiatives in the DRC? The US understands China’s ascendants in the DRC and 
believes a Western human rights alternative to bad economic agreements will offer greater 
support to the local population. In this regard, the US is correct in its assumptions.  
Until recently, with the formation of the ICC, there was no organized institution in the 
international system to enforce a legalism based on agreement. Nonetheless, the UN fails to do 
this, most persistently in the DRC case. The UN attempts a jurisprudential norm setting agenda, 
yet post-WWII history validates the impotence of this system. This cosmopolitanism attempts to 
harmonize the aggravated nature of human beings as equivocating norm setters who seek peace 
as a means to an end across national boundaries. The staunch reality of the DRC case is this: the 
UN is a weak system in defending the human rights regime. The reality in the international 
system, however, is much darker. Although the foundations are there, the documents lack the 
courage to act during large-scale humanitarian strife, as these documents are limited to state 
sovereignty. The UN cannot substantiate universal human value, as state interests persist above 
all else (Article 2, Section 1 of the UN Charter substantiates sovereign equality).  
Despite the DRC case and the UN’s juridical weakness, there is a positive movement in 
providing a legal structure for justice in the DRC. First, the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
as established by the Rome Statute, is a significant move towards universal human rights law at a 
larger level. However, despite this move towards a utopianism in international human rights law, 
the ICC suffers from the same pitfalls as the UN Security Council in that it relies on states to 
sign and ratify its statutes. However, Marlies Glasius notes that it is a significant move towards a 
global civil society, or as discussed earlier, a cosmopolitan ideal of the international system.101 
Nonetheless, Glasius notes several problems and successes with ICC jurisdiction in the DRC. In 
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2003, President Joseph Kabila granted the ICC jurisdiction in all areas deemed a matter of urgent 
attention in human rights abuses.102 Immediately, with the help of the transitional government of 
the DRC, an arrest was made for the leader of a major political movement known as the Union of 
Congolese Patriots where he was transferred from Kinshasa to The Hague.103 Although arrests 
were made of several important political leaders who had committed crimes such as “murder, 
inhumane acts, sexual slavery, using child soldiers, intentionally attacking civilians, and 
pillaging resources,” institutional problems in the ICC have since kept criminal sentencing from 
progressing.104 Additionally, the ICC has run into several problems with connecting its shabby 
offices in limited cities in the DRC to the local population, which has suffered from a non-
existent judicial system that at one time gave amnesty to several warlords.105 Regardless, it was 
found that most Congolese believed the ICC was not damaging nor interrupting the fragile peace 
process and that large percentages of the population supported its arrests of warlords.106  
The major concern of the ICC has been its lack of outreach to the local populations, 
which has damaged its legitimacy; however, it is sufficient to conclude that the ICC’s attempts to 
usher in human rights law in a place where no judicial system exists nor a strong enough 
government to enforce any arrests is a positive feat.107 The ICC must be reformed so that 
prosecutions can be more rapid. An increase in international funding can provide greater 
outreach and an increase in office construction throughout the DRC. Additionally, the US must 
sign once again the statute of the ICC and without Congressional reform that leaves the US away 
from its power. The ICC cannot expect to reform its prosecutorial capacity nor its legitimacy 
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internationally without the backing of the most powerful democracy in the world. Nonetheless, 
the ICC is a tremendously important move in universal legalism and is continuing to help the 
fragile transitional government in the DRC.  
Conclusively, the international system is slowly progressing towards universal legalism. 
Amidst the plethora of human rights doctrines, which theoretically establish a universal structure 
for international law, when these documents are violated and cannot be enforced, as is the case 
with the DRC, it is fair to conclude that the international legal doctrines under the UN and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights cannot adequately stem violence as seen in the DRC. 
Although the ICC cannot stop the violence in the DRC, it can provide a powerful message for 
future aggressors that human rights violations will result in the juridical interference at an 
international level for such crimes. Yet, this positive movement has come too late for the DRC, 
which continues to suffer from a 10-year war; however, it will help deter future aggressions in 
the country. When Kurtz realized at his final moment “The Horror! The Horror!” this was not the 
nightmare of his pillaging and murder of innocent Congolese, but an international system that 
permitted the horrors in the Congo to continue at the hands of Belgium’s greedy imperialism.108 
At its essence, these words have spoken truth throughout all of Congo’s modern history. The 
hypocrisy of a post-WWII order is the center of an international system unable to stop the 
increasing death in the DRC. It is the silence in the international system to these happenings that 








                                                




Reassessing the Central Arguments: An Evolution in UN Peacekeeping? 
 
 The conclusions to my central arguments against or for the emergence of a cosmopolitan 
conception of human worth in a post-WWII international system have several weaknesses and 
challenges. I concluded that the international system has moved progressively towards universal 
legalism, yet I asserted that regardless of these changes, the DRC case cannot support the 
ongoing efforts of the UN to unify states towards an enforceable human rights regime. 
Additionally, my argument limited its focus to domestic turbulence in the DRC to explain the 
condition of the international system. Domestic relations cannot necessarily provide an 
explanation for the entire international system. It is necessary then to provide a cross-cutting 
analysis to redeem the aforementioned research from its circular assumptions. One aspect of my 
thesis evaluated MONUC’s peacekeeping mission to offer a more realistic analysis of the UN’s 
ability to defend the human rights regime and thus, I concluded that UN peacekeeping is a 
defunct agency in global society. However, such a conclusion based on one of many UN 
missions cannot possibly provide an overarching explanation of the modern international system 
as it disregards any possible presentation of other UN missions and therefore, it cannot be tested 
adequately. Thus, the following text will focus on UN peacekeeping in two different cases: UN 
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) from 1992 to 1994 with special emphasis on the US’ role, 
and the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) from 1993 to the months following the 
genocide. These UN missions will be compared with the current and largest UN mission in the 
world, MONUC. These analyses aim to be short and concise, conveying important information 
on their original mandate and future mandates.  
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 Cosmopolitanism and realism, as stated previously, are contending conceptions in 
international relations theory. By examining previous peacekeeping cases, I will attempt to offer 
a more solid and conclusive conception of the international community. When it comes to 
cosmopolitanism and its substantiation, on a smaller level, it can be seen from any UN 
peacekeeping operation given the nature of such missions: to provide universal equality 
regardless of nationality, and to secure international peace as well as security and the rights of 
those individuals regardless of national interest gains. Realism would contend that UN 
peacekeeping is a defunct and overly idealistic system that can only be achieved if states feel a 
national interest is present and attainable. Therefore, I am presenting two cases in UN 
peacekeeping, along with the critical information provided by MONUC’s operations, to give a 
less circular reasoning in my analysis. Evidence of each view will be presented in each case to 
support such claims. Importantly, the history of peacekeeping has demonstrated several missions 
that have either been deemed a failure or a success, depending largely on the willingness of the 
international community to contribute to these missions. Additionally, peacekeeping is 
challenged by the improbability of having universal implementation methods as cases differ do 
to culture and geography. The first UN peacekeeping mission was the United Nations 
Emergency Force – I (UNEF I), in response to Israeli, French, and British hostilities on the 
Egyptian border.109 At this point in time, peacekeeping was limited in its military capabilities, 
and the peacekeeping mission was strictly neutral, and non-coercive.110 Yet, these methods have 
proven complicated and often impossible during the many intrastate wars of the 1990s. 
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Therefore, the following cases may provide a better understanding of the evolution of 
peacekeeping and further explain the contention between cosmopolitanism and realism.  
 
Somalia: One of Many in a New World Order 
 It is no question that all UN peacekeeping operations responded to severe and devastating 
humanitarian strife, collateral damage, and relentless warring factions aimed at securing power 
over the state. Somalia was no exception as the civil war that began in 1991 killed an estimated 
50,000 “non-combatants” and destroyed any remnants of a functioning society.111 The original 
mandate lacked sufficient stipulations to aid an increasingly volatile situation, mostly based off 
reports from the Secretary General. The mandate was concise and persistent in its calls for an 
international humanitarian response. It called for increased airlift operations to deliver 
humanitarian aid to an isolated Mogadishu. Additionally, it established four zonal headquarters 
for the operation, urged logistical support and reiterated the need for an international recognition 
of the humanitarian situation.112 Eventually, after several humanitarian aid efforts on behalf of 
the US (Operation Provide Relief, which airlifted 28,000 tons of aid) and other states, UN 
peacekeeping took a coercive shift in the approval of Security Council Resolution 794 in 
December 2003, and granted the deployment of all necessary means to establish security and 
humanitarian relief operations.113 The US created and led the United Task Force (UNITAF), 
which was supported by nearly 28,000 American troops and 10,000 from other states.114  
 Although Operation Restore Hope was a wake-up call to uneasy Americans that had 
witnessed a dead American soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu after the 
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infamous Black Hawk Down incident, the mission itself was successful. Robert DiPrizio wrote 
that the operation commanded five months and achieved all of the four phases laid out (the 
fourth stage being the handover of operations to the UN) and the UNITAF’s casualties were low, 
at 27 total (18 Americans). The mission’s success prompted the UN to strengthen the original 
mandate to ensure that a recurrence of violence did not happen. Nonetheless, given the Somalia 
case, it is clear that a militarily robust UN mission, although paradoxical, can achieve quick 
results. UN peacekeeping operations had progressed substantially in the post-Cold War 
international system, yet with the remaining decade ahead, more tests of the capacity of UN 
peacekeeping to end violence would arise and question the effectiveness of its operation. 
Notwithstanding, it was apparent that US intervention was necessary and what is the perfect 
example of cosmopolitan ethics. However, the realism existed in the withdrawal of most US 
troops after the Black Hawk Down incident, which may have been a product of US domestic 
reaction to the 18 American lives lost in the battle. Despite the fact that hundreds of Somalis died 
in the fighting, and several more innocent lives had already been lost before and during the UN’s 
mission, the United states ended its support after recognizing the mission was a failure and also 
to appease US Congressional backlash at the mission. Sadly, this abstention would continue 
through the 1990s, even in the face of genocide.  
 
The Genocide in Rwanda: Back to Square One 
 The Rwanda case reveals a troubling and dark period in post-WWII history. The reuse of 
genocide as a form of war was something the UN was created to prevent. However, UNAMIR 
witnessed the worst nonintervention in the international community, stemming directly from 
great power abstention and appeals to withdraw the UN mission in Rwanda. UNAMIR’s 
mandate was severely inefficient before the genocide. The mandate was first meant to facilitate 
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the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement between the rebel Tutsi and Hutus, to monitor the 
ceasefire between the warring parties, and to assist in humanitarian aid.115 In April 1994, the 
Security Council passed a resolution to give the mission intermediary power and continue aid 
efforts that had been cut off as the genocide was underway. Essentially, the mandate emulated 
the weak peacekeeping methods evident during the UNEF I operation, and had no semblance of 
a robust mandate as seen in the Somali case. Samantha Power notes that US “intelligence 
analysts were keenly aware of Rwanda’s history and the possibility that atrocity would occur 
[and]... a CIA study found that some four million tons of small arms had been transferred from 
Poland to Rwanda, via Belgium,” clearly as tools for the genocide.116 The warning signs were 
there, but what kept the United States from intervening on a scale witnessed in Somalia? 
Furthermore, why did the United States and other Security Council members deny UNAMIR 
more troops and instead reduced it from almost 5,000 before the genocide to nearly 300 during 
the genocide?  
During the genocide, in which the Hutu majority was butchering the “cockroach” Tutsi 
minority, UN officials reported that within days of its start, 50,000 Tutsis had been butchered in 
the streets, churches, schools and government agencies, and within a few months, nearly 800,000 
were dead.117 As stated before, Rwanda witnessed the worst in the international community, the 
United Nations and the free world. US and UN bureaucracy cost nearly one million lives. What 
does this mean for cosmopolitan ethics and realism? Firstly, US abstention from intervention in 
Rwanda may stem from the negative political impact of the 18 dead US troops in Somalia. It 
would appear that although the US expressed humanitarianism during the Somalia case and 
basked in its superpower leadership in the ‘New World Order,’ political backlash during the 
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Somalia case caused the United States to rethink its foreign policy in humanitarian interventions. 
UN peacekeeping could not enjoy the willingness of states to stop violence as seen in Somalia, 
and state interests would once more impede on progress in the human rights regime.  
 
Conclusions: 
 What do these two cases in UN peacekeeping mean for MONUC? MONUC at first was a 
substantially week mission, severely undermined by the Secretary-General at the time and the 
mandate took years to reach an adequate level. Although MONUC still lacks enforcement power, 
UN forces have been aiding the transitional government in purging the DRC of rebel factions 
crossing national borders to pillage resources, rape women, destroy villages, and steal children to 
enhance their campaigns. The UN Security Council has never failed the DRC because it has 
persistently adapted the several issues hampering the mandates proper implementation and the 
success of the transitional government. However, it is not the actions of the UN that should be 
condoned, but rather, the lack of timing in passing and implementing these changes. It is no 
mistake that the majority of people, regardless of nationality, do not know of how severe the 
situation in the DRC has been for more than 10 years. Yet, realistically, amidst the emergence of 
coercive peacekeeping in the Somalia case or “armed humanitarians” according to Robert 
DiPrizio, and what was later seen in Kosovo, there has been a positive cosmopolitan movement 
in peacekeeping.  
The phenomenon of UN peacekeeping, as evidenced by Somalia, Rwanda and the DRC, 
has had several weaknesses. Rwanda was a failure and the genocide occurred because there was 
an international community of the unwilling, yet when willing international actors are involved, 
most importantly the United States, UN peacekeeping is at its strongest and missions are more 
likely to succeed. The DRC case is interesting because although it receives more than $1 billion 
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in international aid and the largest UN peacekeeping force in the world, the darkness of the 
situation there is the absence of international awareness. Nonetheless, the DRC case, although a 
failure in many respects, substantiates a cosmopolitan shift in international politics because it 
utilized the evolutionary peacekeeping seen in Somalia i.e. a shift in mandate strength. The 
human rights regime has provided a viable alternative to collective security, which was mostly a 
failure in the League of Nations system. The darkness does not lie in the international 
community as a whole, but within abstention from intervention. The DRC is the beneficiary of 
US efforts (AFRICOM), UN efforts, and efforts by international organizations, but not of a 
wide-scale military operation as seen in Somalia. I will say lastly that the darkness lies also in 
ignorance, a contagious reality for the DRC.  
 
 
 
 
